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C laudia  von  B ra u n m ü h l (B er lin )
W hen Jam aica and the In ternational M onetary Fund (IM F) are dis­
cussed, more often th an  not the m ind wonders back to  the last years of 
the Manley Government, when the then prim e m inister did not subm it 
to  the demands of the Fund but called elections and in O ctober 1980 lost 
them  by a large m argin. This phase in Jam aica’s history, although only 
of three years duration, has been researched and described frequently and 
in depth.
The conservative Jam aica Labour P arty  (JL P) and its prim e m inister 
Edw ard Seaga im m ediately after taking office resumed negotiations w ith 
the IM F. In the m eantim e, Jam aica has been living for 8 years under 
the regime of IM F agreements, the 4 th  at present, and they are publicly 
referred to  as “dictates” . Surprisingly little  is known about these agree­
ments which have become a decisive factor in the life of the Jam aican 
people and which have changed it drastically.
This presentation, therefore, is about w hat has been happenning in 
the eighties, about “restructuring” as prim e m inister Seaga term ed it, 
or ra ther, “structu ra l ad justm ent” which is the technical te rm  the IM F 
and the world bank are using. The paper will follow the sequence of 
agreements, will probe into their professed intention and will analyse 
their actual consequences.
But a t first a look at the agreements. If we remember, the controversial 
points leading to  the break w ith the IM F in the la te  seventies were two 
demands pu t to  the M anley-government which the Fund was taking a 
hard  line on: F irstly  further devaluation and secondly massive public 
sector redundancies. The first agreement between the conservative JLP 
government w ith the IM F contained no such demands. Just as no pressure 
was put on the new government to  term inate public sector employment 
schemes. On the other hand the JLP was granted economic targets th a t 
entailed by far more consumer im ports th an  conceded to  its predecessor. 
In other words the agreement did spell out the classic conditionalities 
of structu ral adjustm ent program m es like im port liberalisation, removal 
of all kinds of subsidies, including those on basic food item s, cuts in 
the public budget, increase in revenue, provision of export incentives, 
divestm ent of government-owned business, including public utilities, and 
a decrease in the circulation of money. Thus the IM F took pains to
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complement the political victory of the JLP at the polls w ith an economic 
and  social underpinning th a t it would need for its consolidation in power.
As usual the so-called stabilization agreement was to  last for 3 years. 
W ithin  this period the foundations for the process of restructuring  were 
to  be laid and for this purpose the IM F, the world bank, and US ATT) 
together credited Jam aica 2 billion US dollars. 2 1 /2  years la ter the 
agreem ent was suspended. Jam aica was unable to  meet some of the test 
requirem ents and subsequently the IM F stopped paym ents of its tranches. 
W hat had  happened?
W ith in  this tim e span im ports, more then  half of them  m ade up of 
luxury consumer item s, had risen by 50%, export had fallen by one th ird , 
to ta l production was down one fifth, the budgetary  deficit was up one 
fifth. The relation between external debt and Gross N ational Product 
which in 1980 had been around 80% jum ped up to  a 140%, the debt ra tio  
which in 1980 was a 120% now ranged a t to  220%. It was only now th a t 
talk  of a Jam aican debt crisis came up.
The second agreement of November 1983 now turned  out to  be ex­
trem ely strict: more th an  300% devaluation, public sector layoffs am ount­
ing to  one th ird  of the  labour force in the  sector. These were the exact 
conditionalities which 4 years earlier were the reason for the P N P ’s (Peo­
ple’s N ational P arty ) break w ith the Fund and which initially the JLP 
had  been spared. This agreem ent, too, did not run  its full course. In A u­
gust 1985 there was a th ird  agreement which was supposed to  extend over 
a 21 m onths period, bu t was suspended after no more th an  6 weeks. In 
O ctober 1985 the PN P called for a wake w ith a subsequent silent m arch 
to  the  seat of the national bank in the early m orning hours. Shortly af­
terw ards prim e m inister Seaga asked the three m ain donors of the island, 
IM F, world bank, and  USAID, “to take a fresh look” a t the situation  
of restructured  Jam aica. A special mission comprising the three organi­
zations came to Jam aica, held talks w ith the government and business 
representatives, and in spring of 1986 subm itted a report -  in which it in­
sisted on continuation of a strict austerity  course. Seaga refused, and for 
over a year a situation  existed which was referred to  as “IM F im passe” . 
There simply was no agreement. The government was able to  take this 
course because of unexpected savings from lower oil prices on the world 
m arkets. In M arch 1987, the IM F consented to  a fourth agreement which 
deviates from  the classic course of neoliberal struc tu ra l adjustm ent. Rein­
troduction  of basic food subsidies was perm itted , im port regulation, and 
an inflation ra te  not exceding 10%. Most im portan t the recently adopted 
practice of the Jam aican government, m anipulating the exchange ra te  to 
rem ain stable was allowed to continue. Since then  first fragile signs of 
economic improvement can be observed.
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A gainst this background an  economic advisor of Michael M anley has 
discribed the situation of Jam aica in the eighties as such:
The fact is th a t every action of significance it took over the 
period was influenced by the anticipated reactions of the IM F 
or the perceived im pact which it could have on the conditions 
of the Agreement in force. W ithin  such a framework, gov­
ernm ent actions were guided by w hat would seem to be the 
m ost relevant section of the current Agreement. As such the 
idea of long-term  economic planning becam e more and  more 
rem ote as senior S tate technicians were fully occupied in ei­
ther im plem enting and m onitoring the current program m e or 
involved in negotiating a future agreement. (Davies 1986)
Before turning to the effects of restructuring, let us discuss shortly 
the intentions of IM F policy directives, or ra th e r the sta ted  intentions. 
W ith  this year’s annual m eeting of IM F and world bank a ttrac tin g  much 
atten tion  this is widely discussed at present and shall therefore only be 
sum m arized here.
A country is supposed to enjoy sufficient growth for it to  pay back its 
debt. The IM F and in the eighties, this was not always the case, the world 
bank too, are convinced firstly th a t outw ard-oriented countries show b e t­
ter results th an  do inw ard-oriented ones. And secondly, w hat has been 
called private enterprise is a b e tte r engine of growth th an  government. 
A nd the IM F and the world bank are convinced, th a t their convictions are 
general tru th s , applicable everywhere and under any circum stances bu t 
unfortunately  not always heeded. Jam aica for instance, w ith its inw ard- 
oriented strategy of the seventies or, to  pu t it in  the  language of the tim e, 
its strategy of self-reliance, according to  IM F and world bank took a 
to ta lly  wrong turn . From  a worldmarket perspective this resulted in  dis­
to rted  productive structures and a standard  of living which in actual fact 
the country could not afford. Therefore Jam aica needs to  be structurally  
adjusted  and, clearly, some “assistance” to  th a t effect has to  be given.
It would not be difficult to  show point by point how and to  what 
extent the individual elements of struc tu ra l adjustm ent do not achieve 
their s ta ted  targets, bu t space does not allow to do so here. In tru th  
the aims of struc tu ra l adjustm ent fall wide off the m ark. T hat fact in 
itself could be cause for some serious discussion about the real if not 
s ta ted  intentions of struc tu ra l adjustm ent. However, this presentation 
will confine itself to  a ra ther cursery view on aggregate data.
Three years are supposed to  be sufficient tim e for struc tu ra l adjustm ent 
to  be effective. We have seen already w hat devastating results it had 
achieved from 1983 to  1985. But m aybe more tim e is needed; m aybe 
after, say 6 to  8 years, things look quite different?
They do look different. Now
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• the  national debt has gone up to  4,2 billion US dollars. 1980 it was 
1,2 billion.
• the debt ra tio , th a t is the relation between to ta l debt and to ta l 
export earnings has risen to  262% (1980: 125%), the ra tio  to  the 
GNP is 150%, th a t is twice a t high as 1980.
• the actual GNP lies 20% below th a t of 1972.
• exports have fallen 16%.
• in  addition to  20.000 redundancies in  the public sector a further 
20.000 jobs have been lost in the industrial sector, m ostly in small 
industries; production capacity is at 50%, the investm ent ra te  at 
60%.
• debt and debt service increase faster th an  do production and export.
Grow th has not been achieved. On the contrary, there is now hardly
any chance for the country to  produce itself out of its debt. To pu t it  more 
clearly: the very debt th a t will chain the country for years to  its “donors” 
to  a large extent has been created through structu ra l adjustm ent.
And som ething else looks different now.
• According to  statistics collated by the C aribbean Food and N utri­
tion  In stitu te , in  1979 a  family of the size of 5 had to  spend 92% of 
its  then m inim um  wage to  secure basic food requirem ents, in  1985 
it  was 250%. Local dishes, formally more common to poor people, 
have grown into hardly affordable festive meals. Akee and  Saltfish. 
Saltfish 185% m ore expensive. Vegetable soup w ith flour dumpling. 
F lour 214% more expensive. T inned milk, the m ain  source of milk 
for poor people, 83% m ore expensive, chicken neck and  back, most 
im portan t source of anim al protein  for poor people, 74% m ore ex­
pensive.
• E lectricity and water rates more than  doubled, the price of cooking 
gas has tripled. Many women returned to  cooking w ith coal on an 
old wheel rim.
• The Rent Assessment Board, once set up as a protective device 
for people against excessive rent demands, now became the very 
agency th a t ruthlessly effects rent hights and evictions in protection 
of middle class interests. Housing construction has dwindeld down 
to  30% of what it was in the seventies. Housing conditions are 
increasingly dense and desperate.
• Schooling has become a precious good difficult to  access. T rans­
po rt, school uniforms, school books, everything has gone up over 
more than  300%, the ra te  of devaluation, th a t is. Because of the 
cuts in government spending the basic school program m e has been 
suspended alltogether. Spending on prim ary schools has fallen one
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th ird , on teachers training two thirds. Sometimes funds allo tted  
are not released. Government owes them  to  the institu tion , bu t de­
lays the actual disbursement in order to  meet specific IM F targets. 
Tertiary education institu tions like the College of A rts, Science, 
Technology and the University of the West Indies now a ttra c t a 
cess.
• Nearly 50% of all teachers have left the schools. M any of them  
joined the ranks of a ra ther recent species, the inform al commercial 
im porter (ICI). These are higglers who im port foreign consumer 
goods which are high in  demand. Low salaries for highly qualified 
people cause them  to leave the educational system. In agreement 
w ith IM F stipulations wage raises are not to  excede 15% and, in 
fact, after an extended strike, teachers got an increase of 13% for 
the whole of 8 years. On the other hand  working conditions in 
the educational sector became more unbearable. Now the average 
prim ary school class counts 55 children. All over the  island schools 
are vandalized by poor people of the area. Particu larly  after summer 
holidays benches, chairs, lavatories, basins, whole wooden walls are 
found missing and  government had  th reatened to  stop financing the 
necessary repairs.
• Medical care becomes equally difficult to  access. Vaccination pro­
grammes, m osquito control, preventive exam inations in  school -  
government money is to  be saved -  are curtailed or term inated  
alltogether. One institu tion  training nurses has been closed, the 
o ther one did not take in new students for years. Training in  mid- 
wivery was suspended for a couple of years. The widely acclaimed 
com m unity-health-aid-program m e providing a  link between cura­
tive and preventive medicine has been term inated  alltogether. M any 
ru ral hospitals and health  centres have been closed or “downgrad­
ed” , meaning th a t their equipments and their services have been 
scaled down substantially. Formerly freely rendered services of the 
public health  system  as for instance p re - and an te -n a ta l health  
care, delivery, prescribed m edication, now have to  be payed for. 
Oftentimes the staff does not have the heart to  insist on the money. 
Consequently m any health  centres work w ith highly fictional bud­
gets. Their patients simply cannot pay and government does not 
disburse its funds in tim e due to  IM F targets th a t have to  be m et. 
On the other hand, in order to keep specialists on the island, public 
hospitals have reintroduced private wards.
Government provisions for health  and education are the only option for 
the large m ajority  of the people to  secure their future. It is in  these areas 
th a t basic decisions about the quality of their lives and their chances in
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society are being made. D eterioration in these sectors does not reflect 
im m ediately in num bers and figures. I t is their fu ture pawned out.
In a few years from now donor agencies -  this trend  has already begun 
-  will “identify” development projects of undebatable social need and 
great hum an urgency. R ehabilitation will follow structu ra l adjustm ent 
and  again it will all be part of development policy dialog.
B ut to  re tu rn  to  the topic of growth. One growth industry  does exist. 
It lies in  the K ingston Free Zone. This is where US based firms place 
usually old equipm ents into brandnew turn -key  factory space provided 
for by the Jam aican government w ith donor credits to  be serviced sind 
payed back eventually. So far about 15.000 women have been hired. In 
piece labor they add a few stitches to  brassieres or precut hosery fabrics, 
before the value added product leaves the free p o rt to be shipped back to 
the US, in  the process a ttrac tin g  a  substan tia l am ount of various sorts of 
subsidies and exemptions. The much herolded C aribbean Basin In itiative 
secures certain  benefits for such production in the US, too. Therefore 
fu rther factory space is in high demand. Further benefits bu t tem porary  
construction work and piece labour do not accrue to  the country. Linkages 
to  local production  do not exist.
Trade unions are not adm itted  to  the free zone. The women earn be­
tween 80 and 90 Jam aican dollars per week w ith the purchasing power of 
the Jam aican dollar lying under th a t of the deutschm ark. Ju st the same, 
it is not the issue of rem uneration th a t brought the recent cry for union 
representation, bu t ra th e r insufficient facilities such as cantines, resting 
space and, a t the end of the day, a refreshing shower in  order to  make 
the way home w ith a sense of respectability. Foremost, however, it is the 
unaccustom ed reduction to  an element of the labour force and  nothing 
bu t th a t, and the more often th an  not white expatria te  m anager to  whom 
no trade union will form  an a rb itra ting  link and who are frequently com­
pared w ith the overseer of the oldtim e p lan ta tion  society. The issue of 
the free zone has be discussed widely in the media, and there is always 
a tin t of shame in it. A quarter century after independence for badly 
needed jobs to  come around only in this form and under these conditions 
is indeed a most painful experience.
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